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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS-AN UNSOLICITED
REPLY TO PROFESSOR NIMMER
I
INTRODUCTION
In London Film Productions v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc.,i
a federal district court for the first time accepted jurisdiction over
an action for foreign copyright infringement. The plaintiff, a British
motion picture film production corporation, alleged that the de-
fendant, a New York licensing corporation, had contributorily in-
fringed its motion picture copyrights in Chile and other South
American countries.2 The sole basis ofjurisdiction was diversity of
citizenship.3 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign claims. 4
The complaint alleged no violations of United States law. 5
United States courts have resisted finding subject matter juris-
diction in intellectual property cases, at least with regard to foreign
trademark and patent cases. 6 The London Film court distinguished
1 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The case was later dismissed on the merits on
July 27, 1984, after an out-of-court settlement. Telephone conversation with Stuart A.
White, counsel for the defendant (Oct. 26, 1984).
2 580 F. Supp. at 48. The contributory infringement claim was based primarily on
licensing agreements between the defendant and Dilatsa S.A., a quasi-governmental
buying agent for Chilean television stations. The defendant specialized in licensing mo-
tion pictures produced by others that it considered to be in the public domain. The
defendant allegedly granted the Chilean television authority the right to distribute and
exhibit the plaintiff's motion pictures on television in Chile, without the plaintiffs per-
mission. The plaintiff contended that the motion pictures in question were protected by
copyright in Great Britain as well as in Chile, and that the defendant's licensing agree-
ment deprived it of the opportunity to market its motion pictures for television. Id. The
plaintiff alleged similar infringements in Venezuela, Peru, Equador, Costa Rica, and
Panama. Id. at 50 n.6.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1982).
4 580 F. Supp. at 48. The defendant also moved to dismiss on the grounds that
the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens should apply even if the court did
have subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court rejected the application of this doctrine
because the New York defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in any foreign
forum. The court held that a forum non conveniens dismissal is inappropriate unless
another forum is available, "for if there is no alternative forum 'the plaintiff might find
himself with a valid claim but nowhere to assert it.'" Id. at 50 (quoting Farmanfarmaian
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1978) (availability of alternate forum necessary to validate dismissal of action on
grounds of forum non conveniens)). See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
5 580 F. Supp. at 48. The films had at one time been subject to United States
copyrights, but these had expired by the time of the dispute.
6 See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
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copyright infringement cases from trademark and patent cases
based on the writings of Professor Melville B. Nimmer.
7
Professor Nimmer observes that, in general, foreign states must
perform "administrative formalities," before their trademarks and
patents are valid. 8 To decide a foreign trademark or patent in-
fringement case, therefore, a court would need to pass on the valid-
ity of the actions of a foreign country's officials to determine
whether the trademark or patent were valid under that country's
law.9
Foreign copyright law generally recognizes a valid copyright to
exist upon creation of the work. 10 Professor Nimmer notes that
under virtually all foreign copyright laws, "there are no administra-
tive formalities" which must be satisfied in order to create or to
perfect a copyright."' 12 According to Professor Nimmer, United
States courts balk at adjudicating foreign trademarks and patents
because they are reluctant to "pass upon the validity of acts of for-
eign governmental officials."' 3 This concern is not present' 4 in a
foreign copyright matter, as foreign copyrights may be created with-
out administrative action. 15 Thus, Professor Nimmer believes that
"copyright infringement constitutes a transitory cause of action, 16
and hence may be adjudicated in the courts of a sovereign other
7 580 F. Supp. at 49.
8 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 3 NIM-
MER]. The purpose of this Note is to serve as a respectful rebuttal to Professor Nim-
mer's theory concerning the propriety of American courts' exercising jurisdiction over
foreign copyright infringement actions.
9 Id.
10 "Most foreign countries do not require a copyright notice or any other formali-
ties as a condition to copyright under their respective domestic laws." Id., § 17.08.
Such countries believe the protection of authors' rights should flow automatically from
creation of the work and should not depend on compliance with any administrative for-
malities. According to this theory, technical formalities necessary to create or perfect a
copyright create pitfalls for unwary authors. Thus, as soon as a work is created, it is
protected to the extent allowed by the domestic law. UNESCO, THE ABC oF COPYRIGHT
53-55 (1981).
11 For the purposes of this Note, the term "administrative formalities" is defined as
the examination procedures a country's government requires before a trademark, pat-
ent, or copyright can be created or perfected.
12 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03.
13 Id.
14 Id. "While other courts in patent and trademark cases have declined to exercise
jurisdiction in actions for infringement under foreign laws, this has been based upon a
ground that may not be applicable in the case of actions for infringement of foreign
copyrights laws." Id.
15 Id.
16 "Actions are 'transitory' when transaction on which they are based might take
place anywhere, and are 'local' when they could not occur except in some particular
place; the distinction being in nature of subject of injury and not in means used or place
at which cause of action arises." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1343 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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than the one in which the cause of action arose." 17
The London Film court found the logic of Professor Nimmer's
theory compelling.18 Judge Carter drew a marked distinction be-
tween a foreign copyright and either a foreign trademark or a for-
eign patent, based on Nimmer's administrative formality
characterization. Therefore, the patent and trademark precedents
and authorities received neither controlling nor persuasive bearing
on the outcome.' 9
The court attempted to buttress adoption of Professor Nim-
mer's theory by identifying an independent reason to adjudicate the
claim: reciprocity. "An unwillingness by this court to hear a com-
plaint against its own citizens with regard to a violation of foreign
law will engender. . . a similar unwillingness on the part of a for-
eign jurisdiction when the question arises concerning a violation of
our laws by one of its citizens .... -2o The interest of reciprocity,
however, is incompatible with the rationale underlying Professor
Nimmer's theory. The propriety of American adjudication of for-
eign copyright claims is premised on the lack of administrative for-
malities necessary to secure or perfect a foreign copyright.21 In the
United States, however, the fulfillment of various administrative for-
malities is a condition precedent to the perfection of a copyright.22
Thus, foreign adjudication of American copyright claims necessi-
tates that foreign tribunals pass upon the validity of acts performed
by American governmental officials. It is unclear why Judge Carter
felt obliged to foster foreign adjudication of American claims under
the same circumstances which purportedly rendered American juris-
diction over foreign actions improper. Judge Carter did not recon-
cile, nor even mention, the inconsistency inherent in his approach.
This Note argues that in deciding whether to exercise federal
jurisdiction over foreign copyright infringement actions, courts
should not rely on a bright-line distinction between intellectual
17 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03. One commentator admitted that it is not easy
to find a satisfactory definition of a transitory cause of action, B. CURRIE, SELECTED Es-
SAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 311 (1963).
18 The facts in this case confirm the logic of Nimmer's observation. The
British films at issue here received copyright protection in Great Britain
simply by virtue of publication there. Chile's adherence to the Berne
Convention in 1970 automatically conferred copyright protection on
these films in Chile. Therefore, no "act of state" is called into question
here. . . .The litigation will determine only whether an American cor-
poration has acted in violation of a foreign copyright, not whether such
copyright exists, nor whether such copyright is valid.
London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 49-50 (citation and footnote omitted).
19 Id. at 49.
20 Id.
21 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03.
22 See infra note 24.
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property that is created without administrative formality23 and intel-
lectual property which must be perfected by administrative action.24
23 See supra note 10.
24 In some countries, including the United States, securing and/or perfecting a
copyright may require various formalities, such as deposit of copyrighted works, copy-
right notice, and registration. UNESCO, supra note 10, at 53-55. For example, in the
United States, statutory copyright protection is triggered when the work is "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). However, before a person
can institute an action for infringement of a United States copyright, registration with
the Copyright Office is required. The Register of Copyright has discretion prior to reg-
istration to determine whether "the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject
matter and that the other legal and formal requirements . .. have been met." 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(a). The Register of Copyrights does not determine originality. "It is thought that
such an inquiry ... is better left to the courts rather than to an administrative agency."
2 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 7.21 [A]. Thus, although "a [registration] certificate repre-
sents prima facie evidence of copyright validity. . . a claim to copyright is not examined
for basic validity before a certificate is issued." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 157 (1976). Other countries which require registration to perfect a copyright in-
clude: Argentina, Bangladesh, Columbia, Lebanon, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Para-
guay, Philippines, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Countries which require any
assignment or transfer of the copyright to be registered include: Brazil, Chile (if trans-
fered to publisher), Japan, and Portugal. Countries where registration merely provides
prima facie evidence of ownership include: Canada, Ecuador, India, Italy, Pakistan, and
Peru. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 14 COPYRIGHT 213, at 213-50,
277-311, 353-84, 419-52 (1978).
The paradigm of an administrative act of government necessary to create an intel-
lectual property right is the grant of letters patent. The examination is the degree of
official scrutiny exercised by an administrative agency of government, the patent office,
before patent rights are granted. If the examination passes upon the novelty of the
alleged invention, see infra note 76, the country is said to have an examination system.
Most technologically advanced countries, including the United States, have an examina-
tion system. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALS §§ 1.02, 19.0111] (1985).
In the United States, the patent application is assigned to an individual examiner,
who conducts a search of the relevant prior art before making an administrative determi-
nation of patentability. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1982). Patent claims may be rejected
if the invention is not statutory matter, lacks novelty or utility, or is obvious, or if the
applicant fails to comply with disclosure requirements. Upon rejection, the applicant is
entitled to reexamination and appeal, first to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences, 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-35 (1982), which may be followed by an appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals, or the District Court, for the District of Columbia, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 141-45 (1982). An issued patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982). This
presumption is successfully rebutted, however, in a high proportion of litigated patents.
The modicum of certainty as to the patent's validity is due to the ex parte nature of the
application process and the less than state of the art searches administrative officials are
able to make. P. ROSENBERG, supra, § 19.01[l].
Many countries maintain a nonexamining registration patent system. PATENTS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 478-79 (A.M. Greene 2d ed. 1984). In a registration country,
administrative officials do not make a novelty determination before patent rights are
granted. Rather, applications are superficially screened for compliance with certain mat-
ters of form. "To warrant denial of patent rights by the patent office of a registration
country. . . the irregularity must be apparent on the face of the application papers ......
P. ROSENBERG, § 19.01[l], at 19-5. Examples would be nonstatutory subject matter or
improper form of claims. Id.
With respect to administrative formalities, trademarks are probably best viewed as
fitting somewhere between copyrights and patents. The inception of a trademark, like a
copyright, does not depend upon an administrative act of the government. Although
[Vol. 70:1165
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Such a bright-line approach assumes that a foreign state's only in-
terest in litigating infringement actions under its own copyright law
lies in protecting its administrative acts from adjudication by United
States courts. This Note asserts that a foreign state's interests tran-
scend mere deference to the administrative actions of its official.
The foreign state possesses a sovereignty interest in preserving the
socio-economic, cultural, and political benefits its copyright law in-
tended to advance. American courts should consider these interests
in deciding whether to accept or decline jurisdiction over foreign
copyright infringement actions.
In this respect, Professor Nimmer's methodology for determin-
ing the propriety of exercising federal jurisdiction over foreign
copyright infringement adjudication, as well as the "act of state"
language 25 upon which it is based, is inadequate. A more sophisti-
cated interest analysis, 26 designed to reflect a foreign state's pecu-
liar interest in its intellectual property rights is needed.
This Note first examines the few federal court decisions which
have confronted similar jurisdictional questions in foreign trade-
mark and foreign patent infringement actions. 27 Next, this Note cri-
tiques Professor Nimmer's attempt to distinguish these precedents
from foreign copyright infringement actions on the basis of the "ad-
ministrative formality" distinction.28 Thereafter, this Note exam-
ines the local action doctrine29 and argues that its underlying
considerations are relevant to jurisdictional determinations con-
cerning foreign copyrights. 30 This Note concludes by offering an
interest-based proposal for determining the propriety of exercising
jurisdiction over foreign copyright infringement actions. 3'
perfection of a trademark may require registration with the appropriate government
agency, "such registratio[n] merely involve[s] official recognition of preexisting rights."
Id. § 1.02, at 1-6. As with patents however, most countries require an administrative
agency to examine the trademark for distinctiveness. TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD 853-54 (W. White & B. Ravenscroft ed. 1978).
25 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
26 Rejection of a mechanical test in favor of a more flexible test brings with it in-
creased uncertainty. Such uncertainty need not be a permanent characteristic of a flexi-
ble approach, however. Although initial cases will require hard balancing, once
precedent is established the law will become more certain.
27 See infra Section IIB.
28 See infra Section III.
29 See infra text accompanying note 103.
30 See infra Section IIIC.
31 See infra Section IV.
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II
BACKGROUND
A. National Treatment-Entertaining Foreign
Copyright Actions Requires Application of Foreign
Copyright Law
A full understanding of the jurisdictional question confronting
American courts requires a brief examination of certain aspects of
international copyright law. The two major multilateral copyright
conventions, the Berne Convention3 2 and the Universal Copyright
Convention,33 have largely obviated the conflict of laws problem by
adopting national treatment.3 4 National treatment means that a
member country protects works originating in other member coun-
tries as if such works originated within its own borders.35 Under the
32 International Union For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [hereinaf-
ter cited as Berne Convention], signed in Berne, Switzerland, on Sept. 9, 1886, as
amended. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 8, app. 27 (text of 1971 Paris Revision reproduced).
The Berne Convention dates back to 1886 and has had two additions and five revi-
sions, the most recent of which was the Paris Revision, see id. apps. 26, 27 (text of 1948
Brussels Revision, 1971 Paris Revision reproduced, respectively). As of 1982, some 74
nations were members, the most notable exceptions being the United States and the
Soviet Union. S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHrs 89,
134-35 (1983). For an in-depth discussion of the Berne Convention, see C. MASOUYE,
GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION (1978).
33 Universal Copyright Convention, completed in Geneva, Switzerland, on Sept. 6,
1952 (effective Sept. 16, 1955), as amended. 4 NIMMER, supra note 8, apps. 24, 25 (text
of Geneva treaty and 1971 Paris Revision reproduced, respectively). The Universal
Copyright Convention (UCC) was adopted in 1952 and revised in 1971 in coordination
with the 1971 Paris Revision of the Berne Convention. The goal of the UCC was to
attract all countries, particularly the United States, without forcing Berne Convention
members to lower their standards of protection by forcing them to accept the UCC as an
alternative to the Berne Convention. The United States and the Soviet Union joined the
UCC along with about 70 other nations. S.M. STEWART, supra note 32, at 134. For a
discussion of the UCC see A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL
CONVENTION (1968).
34 The multilateral conventions are in effect treaties among sovereign states and as
such are part of public international law. The principle of national treatment is ex-
tended by certain minimum rights which may be invoked in all contracting states irre-
spective of national legislation. Both conventions provide for certain minimum
conditions of copyright protection concerning scope, duration and formalities. Each
contracting state must respect these minimum requirements with regard to foreign
works, even though the conventions do not compel a member state to grant such mini-
mum rights to its own nationals. E. ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-2, 9 (1978).
Conversely, the principle of national treatment can be limited by the rule of reci-
procity. In essence, a country which grants its nationals a longer term than the mini-
mum required by the Convention need only grant that longer term to foreigners if that
longer term is also granted by the foreigner's country. In sum, although the principle of
national treatment is subject to extensions and limitations, it nevertheless remains at the
foundation of the laws of international copyright conventions. Id.
35 S.M. STEWART, supra note 32, at 38. National treatment is also referred to as the
principle of assimilation. Id.
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terms of both the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention, an author who is a national of one of the member states
or who first publishes his work in any member state is entitled to the
same protection the state grants its own authors. Essentially, each
country promises to "assimilate," or treat the nationals of other
countries as its own nationals, for the purpose of copyright
protection.3 6
The international copyright conventions adopted national
treatment for three reasons.3 7 First, national treatment provides
practical benefits for both the courts and the litigants in allowing for
the application of forum law. Courts prefer to apply their own law,
with which they are familiar. Similarly, using only one law makes it
unnecessary to apply a variety of foreign laws within a single trans-
action or court case. Judicial efficiency is served when courts do not
have to rely upon translations of foreign statutes and case law, and
the risk of distorted or inaccurate translations is abated. National
treatment thus results in sounder decisions and increased certainty
in the law.38
Second, national treatment comports with the ideal of interna-
tional law that all persons are equal before the law. Using the same
law in each country for every litigant minimizes discrimination
against the foreigner.39
Third, national treatment upholds the principle of non-extra-
territorial application of copyright laws.40 It is generally accepted
throughout the world that the applicability of any national intellec-
tual property right law is restricted to infringements committed
within that country. 41 For these reasons the international conven-
36 See supra note 34.
37 The principle of lex loci, or the law of the country of origin, is an alternative to
national treatment. Under this doctrine, a work would receive the same treatment
abroad as in the county of origin. Thus, the level of protection accorded a work, deter-
mined either by the nationality of its author or the country of first publication, would
follow the work wherever it goes. S.M. STEWART, supra note 32, at 38.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Kirios, Territoriality and International Copyright Infringement Actions, 22 CoPvRirr L.
SymP. (ASCAP) 53, 54 (1977).
41 An action under the United States Copyright Act will not lie for infringements
occurring outside the jurisdiction of the United States. See Robert Stigwood Group Ltd.
v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d Cir.) (act of infringement within United States is
required to hold defendant accountable for related infringement acts occurring outside
country), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939) (copyright statute given limited effect over acts occurring
abroad only if connected with infringing act occurring within the United States), aft'd,
309 U.S. 390 (1940); Ahbez v. Edwin H. Morris & Co., 548 F. Supp. 664, 667 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (plaintiff's failure to allege infringement within United States warrants dismissal).
Similar results have been reached under United States patent laws. See Canadian
Filters Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir. 1969) (comity prevents
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tions have reaffirmed the territorial application of national copyright
laws rather than created a global system of rights.
National treatment provides a complete rule of conflict of laws.
The applicable law always is that of the state where the infringement
occurred. In practice the plaintiff usually sues in the country where
the infringement occurred. Consequently, the law of the jurisdic-
tion in which relief is sought controls.42 In such a case the policies
underlying national treatment are fully realized.43 When the action
is brought in a national court in a country other than where the in-
fringement occurred, as in the London Film case, the law of the coun-
try in whose territory the infringement occurred controls.44 In such
district court from enjoining Canadian infringement action involving Canadian patent);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel Co., 164 F. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1908)
(refusing to enjoin suit in Cuba for infringement of Cuban patent). Contra United States
v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (British corporation vio-
lated Sherman Act by assigning patents under illegal agreements and was ordered to
reconvey British patents to American corporation).
The principle of non-extraterritorial application of trademark laws has not been
applied as consistently. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (extraterri-
torial application of Lanham Act relying on defendant's United States citizenship and
effects on commerce); Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp.
594 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (extraterritorial application of Lanham Act), a f'dper curiam, 245
F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958). Contra Vanity Fair Mills v. T.
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (Lanham Act should not apply extraterritorially
against foreign citizens acting under presumably valid foreign trademarks), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 871 (1956). In cases concerning protection against trademark infringement
and unfair competition, often the courts assume that "the rules of national law are appli-
cable to competition between national undertakings even if the act of unfair competition
has been committed abroad." E. ULMER, supra note 34, at 11.
Copyright and patent laws should be distinguished from trademark laws with re-
spect to the public interests at stake. For example, under United States law, copyrights
and patents protect "Writings" and "Discoveries" only for "limited Times." U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. When the term expires, the invention or artistic work enters the
public domain. The period of exclusivity for a patent or copyright is granted in ex-
change for complete disclosure of the creative processes by the inventor or author.
Conversely, a trademark is a marketing symbol of indefinite duration if used continu-
ously to identify and distinguish products. As the Supreme Court emphasized, "[t]he
ordinary trademark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery . . . . It re-
quires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded
on priority of appropriation." Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
Trademarks serve the public interest by helping consumers to identify and distin-
guish goods and services. Patents and copyrights, however, serve the more compelling
public interest in having information, both artistic expression and technological innova-
tion, widely disseminated. Extraterritorial application of patent and copyright laws
would "effectively deprive the marketplace of something that local law has provided
shall be available." Kirios, supra note 40, at 61. Conversely, extraterritorial application
of trademark laws would deprive the local marketplace only of the symbol used to mar-
ket the product, not the product itself.
42 S.M. STEWART, supra note 32, at 47.
43 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
44 The plaintiff in London Film incorrectly asserted that the merits of its claims could
be adjudicated simply by reference to the substantive copyright law of Great Britain.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Abstain and Dismiss at 14 n.18,
1172 [Vol. 70:1165
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a case, the policies underlying national treatment are not as well-
served. Moreover, the international copyright conventions do not
address whether a plaintiff may claim legal protection based on a
foreign copyright. Similarly, international patent and trademark
conventions, 45 also founded upon the principle of national treat-
ment, provide no answer to the jurisdictional question with respect
to foreign patents and foreign trademarks. Rather, whether a plain-
tiff may claim legal protection before a national court for the in-
fringement of a foreign intellectual property right has depended on
the view of the particular national court involved.46
London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). The defendant argued in its motion to dismiss that the case would
involve the construction of the laws of all the foreign states where infringement was
alleged. London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 48. Although ruling correctly, Judge Carter ap-
peared somewhat uncertain about the application of national treatment. "Since ... the
applicable law is the copyright law of the state in which the infingement occurred, de-
fendant seems correct in its assumption that the laws of several countries will be involved in
the case." Id. at 50 n.6 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
45 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed in
Paris, France, on Mar. 20, 1883, as amended. Art 2(1) of the Lisbon text of 1958, rati-
fied by this country in 1960 and entered into effect in 1962, provides for national treat-
ment. See 13 U.S.T. 1 (1962).
46 E. ULMER, supra note 34, at 47. For example, German courts have entertained
foreign trademark and patent infringement cases. See, e.g., Judgement of July 8, 1930,
Ger. 1930 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen 129, 385 (trademarks). French courts, however,
have traditionally refused such jurisdiction. See Judgment of Mar. 20, 1967, Cour de
Douai, Fr., 1968 Rev. Crit de DIP 691 (act of infringement being of penal nature presup-
poses act committed within country). Whether the EEC Convention onJurisdiction has
changed the French position remains unclear.
The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, signed Sept. 22, 1968, and ratified by the six original members
of the EEC (entered into force on Feb. 1, 1973), provides in articles 2 and 5(3) that in
tort actions a suit may be instituted both in the contracting state where the defendant
lives and in the contracting state where the injury occurred. Arguably, then, among
these six original member states, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and
West Germany, an action for infringement of any intellectual property right could be
brought both in the country where the defendant lives and the country where the in-
fringement occurred. S.M. STEWART, supra note 32, at 47. Denmark, Ireland, Greece,
and the United Kingdom have not yet acceded to the Convention. Id. at 48.
In the United Kingdom, the general rule as to jurisdiction has been stated as
follows:
(1) As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and action-
able as such in England, only if it is both
(a) actionable as a tort according to English law, or in other words is
an act which, if done in England, would be a tort; and
(b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it
was done.
A. DICEY &J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 938 (9th ed. 1973) (footnote omitted).
Because foreign patents and copyrights are territorial in their operation, the infringe-
ment of copyright in a foreign country would not be a tort if committed in England.
Thus, an act of foreign infringement cannot be brought within the terms of clause (1)(a)
of the rule. Id. at 952-53; W. COPINGER & SKONE JAMES, COPYRIGHT § 554 (9th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as COPINGER & SKONE JAMES]. Copinger and SkoneJames sug-
gest that "where the defendant is within thejurisdiction and, as in the case of a Berne
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
B. Federal Jurisdiction in Foreign Trademark and Patent
Infringement Actions
The London Film court correctly characterized the jurisdictional
question before it as "a novel question of law."' 47 No other federal
court has entertained the jurisdictional question of foreign copy-
right infringement in a reported decision. The federal courts have
determined similar jurisdictional questions with respect to foreign
trademark and patent infringement actions, but only a handful of
such precedents exist. In those patent and trademark cases the fed-
eral courts assumed they had the power to adjudicate but generally
refused to exercise that power as a matter of discretion. 48
1. Trademark Cases
Professor Nimmer adopted the reasoning of the Second Cir-
cuit's trademark infringement decision in Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton
Co. 49 in establishing his "administrative formality" distinction be-
tween foreign trademark and patent actions and foreign copyright
infringement actions. In Vanity Fair, an American textile manufac-
turer sued a Canadian retailer for unfair competition and infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's American trademark. The action was based
primarily on sales the defendant made in Canada, where the defend-
ant was the registered owner of the same mark.50 The court re-
jected plaintiff's request for extraterritorial application of the
Lanham Act 51 and refused to exercise diversity jurisdiction to adju-
dicate the claims under Canadian law. 52 The court declined juris-
diction on the alternative grounds of forum non conveniens 53 and
the act of state doctrine. 54
Convention country, the nature of the wrong is similar under both sets of laws, an action
should be maintainable here." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, the factual pattern in London Film clearly would not be actionable in
England. The plaintiff's works were not protected under United States copyright, see
supra note 5; thus the acts complained of could have been committed in the forum state
with impunity. It follows that the "nature of the wrong" could not, by definition, be
"similar under both sets of laws."
47 London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 48.
48 See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
49 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
50 Id. at 637.
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
52 234 F.2d at 638.
53 "Were this merely a transitory tort action in which disputed facts could be liti-
gated as conveniently here as in Canada, we would think the jurisdiction of the district
court should be exercised." Id. at 647; see infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
54 "[W]e do not think it the province of United States district courts to determine
the validity of trade-marks which officials of foreign countries have seen fit to grant. To
do so would be to welcome conflicts with the administrative and judicial officers of the
Dominion of Canada." 234 F.2d at 647. For a discussion of Vanity Fair's application of
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Professor Nimmer noted that "[t]he Vanity Fair court . .. de-
clined jurisdiction because it did not deem it proper for an Ameri-
can court to pass upon the validity of administrative acts undertaken
by foreign officials." 55 The administrative acts in question con-
sisted of Canadian trademark officials registering the Canadian
trademark to the defendant. 56 This single decision, however, pro-
vides an inadequate basis for extrapolating a general rule to deter-
mine the propriety of foreign copyright infringement jurisdiction. 57
2. Patent Cases
A similar paucity of legal precedent exists concerning the juris-
dictional question in foreign patent actions. The Seventh Circuit
initially suggested that jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement
actions may only exist in cases in which the doctrine of pendent ju-
risdiction could apply. In Ortman v. Stanray Corp. 58 an Illinois citizen
alleged that a Delaware corporation infringed the American, Cana-
dian, Brazilian, and Mexican patent rights to his invention. 59 The
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the foreign claims,
holding that a plaintiff who alleges infringement of a United States
patent may invoke the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to join al-
leged infringements of foreign patents, provided "the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' "60
the act of state doctrine see Kirios, supra note 40, at 66-67. See also infra notes 81-100
and accompanying text (discussing act of state doctrine).
55 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03. Professor Nimmer noted that foreign copy-
rights are perfected without any administrative formalities, but that United States copy-
right law requires such statutory administrative formalities. The statutory requirements
for notice, deposit, and registration of a United States copyright are found in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 401-412 (1982). See also 2 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 7.
56 The plaintiff had secured no rights under Canadian trademark laws. The Cana-
dian Registrar of Trade-Marks had refused the plaintiff's registration on the grounds
that it interfered with the defendant's existing registration. The plaintiff's claim of inva-
lidity could have been the proper subject of a Canadian cancellation proceeding or a
defense to an infringement action brought by the defendant. 234 F.2d at 646.
57 See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text; see also supra note 41 (discussion of
public interests inherent in patent and copyright law as opposed to trademark laws); see
also infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (inapplicability of act of state doctrine).
58 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967). The Seventh Circuit subsequently overruled its
second Ortman opinion on an unrelated evidence issue in SunstreamJet Express v. Inter-
national Air Serv. Co., 734 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1984).
59 371 F.2d at 155.
60 Id. at 158 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
The court in Ortman noted that the alleged infringement of foreign patents did not in-
volve state law but that the reasoning in Gibbs seemed to apply in determining whether
federal jurisdiction existed. The court listed three characteristics of the case that argued
for possible federaljurisdiction: (1) the defendant performed the alleged infringing acts
both in and out of the United States, (2) the parties disputed the interpretation of their
contract, and (3) the interpretation of that contract was important to the decision of
whether the infringement of foreign patents could be considered in the suit.
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Judge Fairchild's concurring opinion suggested that diversity
would constitute a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over the foreign
claims. 61 Nevertheless, the opinion listed several possible reasons
why a court might decline to hear such a case based solely on
diversity:
First, the court may feel that the claim is based on penal or reve-
nue laws, or that it involves some other form of foreign govern-
mental interest. Secondly, the local judicial machinery may not be
suitable to enforcement of the foreign based claim. Thirdly, the
action may be contrary to the public policy of the forum.
Fourthly, the forum state may be precluded from passing on an
"act of state." And lastly, the court may decline to exercise juris-
diction on the basis of forum non conveniens.62
The exact precedential value of the Ortman holding is uncertain
for two reasons. First, the court viewed the presence of pendent
jurisdiction as distinguishing the case from "ordinary circum-
stances, [in which] it would seem clear that plaintiff could not come
into a United States District Court and sue for infringement of [for-
eign patents] based upon alleged acts of the defendant in each of
the foreign countries named."'6 3 Second, the Seventh Circuit subse-
quently reopened the entire jurisdictional question. On remand,
the district court reaffirmed the application of its pendent jurisdic-
tion.64 When the case again came before the Seventh Circuit nearly
two years later, the court, while passing on an unrelated question, 65
stated:
We did not intend ...to prejudge the propriety of the district
court's application of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, nor to
adopt the diversity theory suggested in the concurring opinion,
371 F.2d at 159. It is still open to Stanray to challenge the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign patent causes of
action.66
No final resolution of the jurisdictional issue in Ortman was ever
reported.
61 Id. at 159-60 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
62 Id. (footnotes omitted).
63 Id. at 156.
64 Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 331, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1969). More-
over, the district court stated that it "takes note of and finds much merit in the concur-
ring opinion of Judge Fairchild ...wherein it is suggested that [the court] has
jurisdiction, based upon diversity, to adjudicate the claims for infringement of foreign
patents." Id. at 334.
65 The plaintiff's actions for patent infringement and breach of contract were tried
separately by agreement of the parties and by order of the court of April 11, 1968. Id. at
332.




In the following year, however, the same district court again
confronted the jurisdictional question of foreign patent actions in
Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 67 In Packard, the
plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, alleged that the defendant, a Cali-
fornia corporation, infringed its patents in America and nine foreign
countries. 68 The court, in an apparent attempt to mitigate the un-
certainty created by the Ortman opinions, assumed it possessed the
power to adjudicate the foreign claims, either on the basis of pen-
dent or diversity jurisdiction. 69 The court, however, refused to ex-
ercise that power as a matter of discretion.
The Packard court held that a court may properly abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims
"when the validity of those patents will be put at issue."'70 The court
rationalized its refusal to grant jurisdiction as an application of the
abstention doctrine,7' but commentators, including Professor Nim-
mer, have argued that in substance the court merely articulated the
"act of state" and forum non conveniens considerations expressed
in Vanity Fair.72 The court supplemented its forum non conveniens
decision by considering factors beyond the unavailability of an alter-
nate forum.73 The defendant was not amenable to process in the
foreign countries whose patents were involved, but the court held
that the reasons for abstention were "applicable regardless of
whether all the requirements for dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens [were] present. ' 74
Vanity Fair, Ortman, and Packard represent the spectrum of legal
67 346 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. I11. 1972).
68 The foreign countries were Canada, Sweden, France, Switzerland, Italy, Japan,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel. Id. at 409.
69 Id. at 408.
70 Id. at 409. The court refused jurisdiction because: (1) "a determination of the
issue of validity of a foreign patent would involve a 'form of foreign governmental inter-
est,'" (2) the court "would 'not be suitable to enforcement of the foreign based claim,'"
(3) the court would face difficulty in determining and applying foreign law which is
"based on considerations of a predominantly local nature," (4) the court would be re-
quired "to deal with seven foreign languages in order to decide eight of the ten foreign
patent claims," and (5) resolution of the United States patent claim would provide ade-
quate relief. Id. at 409-11 (quoting Ortman, 371 F.2d at 159 (Fairchild, J., concurring)).
71 See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Kirios, supra note 40, at 69. Professor Nimmer stated that "[t]he same
ground for decision [as in Vanity Fair] was adopted in [Packard]." 3 NIMMER, supra note
8, § 17.03 n.7.
73 See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
74 346 F. Supp. at 410 (footnote omitted). The Packard decision was cited as au-
thority in Goldberg v. Cordis Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 717 (N.D. Ill. 1976). In
Goldberg, the plaintiff, an Illinois citizen, alleged that the defendant, a Florida corpora-
tion, infringed his British and Canadian patents. The court refused to entertain jurisdic-
tion over the foreign patent infringement action, holding that "[t]o determine the
validity of patents granted by foreign governments would invite conflicts with the ad-
ministrative and judicial officers of those governments." Id. at 718.
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precedent dealing with whether a federal court may retain jurisdic-
tion over a claim for the infringement of a foreign intellectual prop-
erty right. The policies underlying these decisions are of great
import in determining federal jurisdiction over foreign copyright in-
fringement actions. Patents, trademarks, and copyrights, referred to
as "intellectual property," have many common legal characteris-
tics. 75 Thus, prior patent and trademark decisions may serve as a




Professor Nimmer's "administrative formality" distinction ren-
ders prior decisions involving patents and trademarks inapplicable
to the jurisdictional determination in foreign copyright actions. His
theory draws a bright line between the appropriateness of adjudicat-
ing the validity7 6 of foreign intellectual property rights that need
administrative formalities to create or perfect them and those that
do not. The decision whether to accept jurisdiction is conditioned
solely upon whether an American court must "pass upon the validity
of administrative acts undertaken by foreign officials." '77 This meth-
odology, as applied by the London Film court, assumes that the for-
eign state is interested only in preserving the presumption of
administrative correctness of its acts in infringement cases. A
court's refusal to accept jurisdiction is, therefore, based upon the
act of state doctrine.78 The patent and trademark precedents which
decline jurisdiction 79 have neither a controlling nor a persuasive ef-
fect on the jurisdictional determination under this theory because
no "act of state" is necessary to create or perfect a foreign copy-
right. The theory assumes the propriety of federal jurisdiction over
75 See, e.g., 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPEITION § 6:1, at 146 (2d
ed. 1984) ("That there are many common characteristics of patents, trademarks and
copyrights cannot be denied.").
76 In all trademark, patent, and copyright infringement actions, a plaintiff must
prove the validity or legal sufficiency of the asserted property right in addition to prov-
ing infringement. At a minimum, validity requires proof of distinctiveness for trade-
marks, novelty for patents, and originality for copyrights. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note
75, § 15:1 (trademarks); P. ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 17.05 (patents); H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 156-57 (1976) (copyrights). An administrative formality nec-
essary to create or perfect the intellectual property right provides, at most, only a rebut-
table presumption of validity. See supra note 24.
77 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03.
78 See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.




foreign copyright infringement actions, and, in effect, ignores the
foreign state's interest in such adjudication.
This reasoning oversimplifies the jurisdictional determination.
The "administrative formality" distinction focuses on a characteris-
tic common only to foreign trademarks and patents, and in so do-
ing, appears to give greater weight to a foreign state's interest in its
trademark and patent laws, to the exclusion of its copyright laws.
This distinction ignores the similarity of the public interests sought
to be advanced by copyright, patent, and trademark laws.80 A for-
eign state's interest in infringement adjudication extends to ensur-
ing that its policies are promoted through proper application of the
law. The presence or absence of an "act of state" necessary to cre-
ate or perfect a foreign copyright should not be the determining
factor in deciding whether to accept jurisdiction.
A. Act of State Doctrine's Inapplicability to Granting of
Foreign Patents
Professor Nimmer's "administrative formality" distinction is an
application of the act of state doctrine.8 ' The act of state doctrine
precludes American courts from "examining the validity of an act of
a foreign state by which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to
give effect to its public interests. '8 2 Although never referring to the
doctrine by name, Professor Nimmer's attempt to reconcile the
trademark and patent decisions in which jurisdiction was refused is
nonetheless based on act of state considerations.8 3 Professor Nim-
mer believes federal courts may adjudicate foreign copyright actions
because the courts do not "need to pass upon the validity of acts of
foreign governmental officials." '8 4 The London Film court apparently
construed Professor Nimmer's theory as an application of the act of
state doctrine. After discussing Professor Nimmer's theory, Judge
Carter noted that "no 'act of state' is called into question here."8 5 If
act of state considerations distinguish the question of federal juris-
diction over foreign copyrights from the question of federal jurisdic-
80 See supra note 41; infra text accompanying note 131.
81 See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 41 (1965). The "act of
state" doctrine is not a rule of international law. Id. at 125 comment a. The first adop-
tion of the doctrine in the United States was in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897), where the Court stated: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Id. at
252.
83 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03. See supra notes 55 & 72 and accompanying text.
84 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.03.
85 London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 49.
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tion over foreign patents and trademarks, the act of state doctrine
warrants further study.
Under the traditional formulation of the act of state doctrine,
whenever adjudication would require questioning the validity of a
sovereign act that "involves the public interests of a state as a state,"
the doctrine would render the issue nonjusticiable.8 6 More recently,
courts have moved away from the traditional approach in favor of a
balancing test which emphasizes separation of powers considera-
tions in conducting foreign policy.8 7 The effect has been to shift the
focus of the doctrine away from respecting foreign sovereignty and
toward avoiding interference with the "executive's conduct of for-
eign policy by judicial review or oversight of foreign acts." 8 8
Several courts have refused to apply the act of state doctrine in
actions involving foreign patents. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp.89 the Third Circuit held that the act of state doctrine
was not intended to protect the granting of patents by foreign coun-
tries. The American plaintiff corporation in Mannington alleged that
the American defendant company violated the Sherman Act 90 by us-
ing its foreign patents to exclude the plaintiff from those foreign
markets. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant procured the for-
eign patents through fraudulent misrepresentations to foreign pat-
ent offices, which would have led to antitrust liability if perpetrated
in securing domestic patents.91 The court held that the defendant
could not interpose the act of state doctrine as a defense92 because
it does not apply to foreign patents: "the granting of the patents
per se, in substance ministerial activity, is not the kind of govern-
mental action contemplated by the act of state doctrine....
In Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp.94 the district court fol-
lowed the Mannington approach. In that case the plaintiff-licensee
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 comment d (1965).
87 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 476 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964), the
Supreme Court emphasized the principle of separation of powers and suggested balanc-
ing three considerations to determine whether the issue should be resolved by the judi-
cial branch or executive branch. The considerations included the consensus of
international law on the act's legality, the foreign relation implications involved, and the
current status of the government that committed the act.
88 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979).
89 Id.
90 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
91 595 F.2d at 1290-91.
92 Id. at 1292-94.
93 Id. at 1294. The Mannington court cited Vanity Fair with approval in its discussion
of possible extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Id. at 1297. The Man-
nington court, however, made no mention of Vanity Fair, Ortman, Packard, or Goldberg in its
discussion concerning the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine to the granting of
patents. Id. at 1292-98.
94 516 F.Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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challenged the defendant-licensor's right to collect royalties under a
licensing agreement on the ground that the defendant had failed to
comply with foreign laws in obtaining the patents upon which the
licensing agreement was based. The court held that:
In these circumstances, the Act of State doctrine does not apply,
for it cannot be said that a determination by an American court
that a private company failed to present relevant information to a
foreign patent office could interfere with our government's con-
duct of foreign affairs. In sum, we agree with the court's holding
in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. .... 95
Any attempt to undercut the general applicability of the Man-
nington court's holding96 on the ground that extraterritorialjurisdic-
tion of the Sherman Act was at issue in that case is mistaken. The
act of state doctrine generally is the most prevalent exception to
exercising Sherman Act jurisdiction in United States foreign com-
merce.97 The doctrine may in fact bar adjudication of an antitrust
cause of action even when the plaintiff demonstrates substantial ef-
fects on United States commerce. 98 If a foreign sovereign's grant of
a patent constituted a sufficient "act of state" to invoke the doctrine,
its application would shield a party from antitrust liability.99 The
Forbo-Giubiasco court refused to distinguish Mannington on antitrust
subject matter jurisdiction grounds:
While it is true that the court in Mannington Mills noted that the
antitrust claims there involved American commerce, it is clear that
this factor was not dispositive to its holding that the Act of State
doctrine did not apply. Instead, the Mannington court concluded
that a grant of a patent is not the type of activity contemplated by
the doctrine. 00
In sum, these recent constructions of the act of state doctrine
95 Id. at 1217. The Forbo-Giubiasco court attempted to distinguish adjudicating the
fraud alleged to have been perpetrated on the foreign patent office in that case from a
case determining the validity of a foreign patent. "This case is identical to Manningon
Mills in that we are not asked to determine the validity of a foreign patent but to deter-
mine whether the foreign patents were obtained through inequitable conduct." Id. at
1218. Despite this distinction the effect of the remedy probably would be the same
whether fraud or patent invalidity involving state acts is litigated, with regard to the
parties before the court. Moreover, an unenforceable patent usually is of no value to its
owner.
96 The court held that the grant of a foreign patent does not trigger the act of state
doctrine. 595 F.2d at 1293-94.
97 See Note, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.: A Further Step Toward a
Complete Subject Matter Jurisdiction Test, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 241, 243 (1980).
98 See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
99 See Note, supra note 97, at 252 ("The involvement of a foreign sovereign in an
activity, though a necessary condition, is not alone sufficient to bring an action within
the act of state doctrine.").
100 516 F. Supp. at 1218.
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militate against applying the doctrine to cases involving foreign in-
tellectual property rights. If the reasons against applying the doc-
trine in this way are sound, further attempts to distinguish the
propriety of federal jurisdiction over foreign intellectual property
infringement actions on the basis of an "act of state" are misguided.
B. Transitory versus Local Actions
The assumption that copyright infringement "constitutes a
transitory cause of action" also underlies Professor Nimmer's the-
ory.101 Several scholars have sought to clarify the vague distinction
between a transitory action and a local action. 0 2 Local action doc-
trine asserts that if the cause of action could have arisen in only one
locale, jurisdiction over that cause can be successfully asserted only
in that locale.' 0 3 A local action, which can occur only at a particular
place, must therefore involve something immovable.'0 4 Conversely,
a transitory cause of action can arise in any location and be adjudi-
cated in any forum satisfying personal jurisdiction and venue re-
quirements.' 0 5 Most courts treat the local action doctrine as a rule
of venue rather than of jurisdiction. 0 6 The policy underlying the
local action venue requirement is to "protect the sovereignty or pe-
culiar local interest of the state in which the res is located by requir-
ing that the action be brought there."' 0 7
In the international context the local action doctrine protects
the "sovereignty or peculiar local interest" of the country granting
101 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, at § 17.03.
If the plaintiff has a valid cause of action under the copyright law of a
foreign country, and if personal jurisdiction of the defendant can be ob-
tained in an American court, it is arguable that an action may be brought
in such court for infringement of a foreign copyright law. This would be
on the theory that copyright infringement constitutes a transitory cause
of action ....
Id. (footnotes omitted). The London Film court stated, "That theory appears sound in
the absence of convincing objections by defendant to the contrary." 580 F. Supp. at 49.
102 See supra note 16.
103 Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REV. 36,
66-69 (1959).
104 Although a local action must involve an immovable, it should be distinguished
from an action in rem. The term "local" includes actions against persons, as for tres-
pass, whereas the term "in rem" affects the interest of all persons in designated prop-
erty. In Livingston v.Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811), precedent compelled
the Court to reject the transitory-local distinction between actions in personam and ac-
tions in rem, respectively. See Currie, supra note 103, at 68 ("it is not possible to tell
whether an action. . . is local or transitory merely by examination of it; it is necessary to
determine what considerations of legal policy limit the freedom of the plaintiff to obtain
trial in courts otherwise competent").
105 Currie, supra note 103, at 66-69.
106 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42, at 250 (4th ed. 1983).




exclusive intellectual property rights. The doctrine is particularly
useful in the international context because national forums are more
vulnerable to parochial prejudices and local bias than, for instance,
are state courts within a federation.' 0 8 Moreover, the doctrines of
national treatment'0 9 and non-extraterritoriality" ° prevail in the
area of intellectual property rights because those rights are pecu-
liarly expressive of a nation's political, socio-economic and cultural
interests. The property rights can be infringed and thus exist only
within the boundaries of the sovereign state whose law created
them. Therefore, although intellectual property rights generally
take the form of intangible property, "not totally immovable in the
sense that [real property] is, [they are] immovable in a very real
sense as between nations."''  Hence some vestige of the local ac-
tion doctrine remains viable.
The same concerns that discourage courts from adjudicating
the validity of foreign patents and trademarks, although often ex-
pressed in act of state language, may be an attempt to compensate
for the possibly undesirable effect of applying peculiarly domestic
legal concepts on an international basis. No case confronting the
jurisdictional issue, however, has squarely answered the transitory-
local action question. The Vanity Fair court never directly re-
sponded to the plaintiff's assertion that unfair competition was a
transitory action. 112 The Ortman majority implicitly approved the lo-
cal action doctrine without mentioning it by following the premise
that in "ordinary circumstances" a national court could not adjudi-
cate a foreign patent infringement action.11 3
108 A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 35, 36 (1970).
109 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
111 Note, supra note 107, at 367 n.49 (emphasis in original). But cf Comment, Ac-
cepting Jurisdiction in Foreign Patent Validity Suits: Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman In-
struments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408 (1972), 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 191 (1976).
Commentators who argue that Congress statutorily determined that copyright and pat-
ent infringement should be considered transitory actions with the passage of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(a) & (b) (1982) fail to consider that such venue provisions apply only to infringe-
ment under United States, not foreign, law.
112 234 F.2d at 365. Professor Nimmer has concluded that the Vanity Fair court as-
sumed it was dealing with a transitory action on the basis of the quote at supra note 53. 3
NIMMER, supra note 8, at § 17.03.
113 371 F.2d at 154, 156. The court apparently did not consider the local action
doctrine ajurisdictional bar if pendent jurisdiction could be established. See text accom-
panying supra note 60. The concurring opinion phrased the question correctly but pro-
vided no answer. The concurrence asked, "Is a cause of action for infringement of a
patent a so-called transitory cause of action which may be adjudicated by the courts of a
sovereign other than the one which granted the patent?" 371 F.2d at 159. The concur-
ring judge further added to the confusion by stating that "[t]heoretically, it is possible
for a state to regard almost any sort of extrastate cause of action as local, but the current
trend is toward readier enforcement of claims arising under foreign laws." Id.
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The Packard court 14 did discuss the local action doctrine in de-
termining whether to exercise jurisdiction. Although the court did
not expressly rely on the doctrine for its result, it did give local ac-
tion fairly thorough consideration:
It has been argued with some force that a foreign patent claim
should be treated as a local rather than a transitory action, be-
cause the validity of a patent, like the title to land, is governed by
distinctively local law and depends upon local procedures and
records, all of which are best understood by local tribunals. How-
ever inappropriate it may be to categorize all foreign patent
claims as local and thereby raise an inflexible jurisdictional bar-
rier, it would be equally doctrinaire to refuse to give weight to the considera-
tions underlying the local-transitoy dichotomy in a case in which they are
pertinent. 15
The Packard court saw local action considerations as being simi-
lar to two of the reasons stated in the Ortman concurrence for a
court's declining to accept jurisdiction. 16 The Packard court, follow-
ing Ortman, suggested that (1) "a determination of the issue of valid-
ity of a foreign patent would involve a 'form of foreign
governmental interest,'" and (2) "a court of the United States
would 'not be suitable to enforcement of the foreign based
claim.' "1117 The Ortman concurrence also mentioned the act of state
doctrine as a possible reason for refusing jurisdiction,"I s but the
Packard court did not mention the doctrine in discussing local action
considerations. This omission cannot be explained as a failure of
the Packard court to consider the act of state doctrine as a possible
vehicle for refusing jurisdiction. The Packard court, in fact, cited
Vanity Fair, a case explicitly using the act of state doctrine to deny
jurisdiction,' 1 9 with approval. 120 Hence, Professor Nimmer's at-
tempt to harmonize the two cases on the basis of the act of state
doctrine fails. 121
The Packard court described its denial of jurisdiction over the
foreign infringement claims as an application of the abstention doc-
trine. 122 More specifically, the court applied a type of abstention
114 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
115 346 F. Supp. at 409 n.1 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
116 Id. See supra text accompanying note 62 (Judge Fairchild's first and second rea-
sons for a court to refuse jurisdiction).
117 346 F. Supp. at 409 (quoting from Ortman, 371 F.2d at 159 (Fairchild, J.,
concurring)).
118 "[The forum state may be precluded from passing on an 'act of state.'" Ortman,
371 F.2d at 159 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
119 See supra text accompanying note 54.
120 346 F. Supp. at 410.
121 See supra note 72.
122 346 F. Supp. at 409. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72. The abstention
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usually invoked within the context of federal/state relations to avoid
needless federal interference with a state's administration of its own
affairs, 123 or when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case . . . at bar."' 124 The Packard court
likened the determination of issues of foreign patent law to a federal
court's consideration of a problem whose resolution "depend[s]
upon applying state policy based on considerations of a predomi-
nantly local nature."'125 The comparison is apt because "a foreign
country's patent law [is] based upon that country's economic and
social policies, which may be very different from those of the United
States.' 126 After weighing these considerations, the Packard court
concluded it was unable to make an informed disposition of the for-
eign claims. 127
The Packard court, in discussing why it rejected jurisdiction,
went beyond Professor Nimmer's concern of deference to "the va-
lidity of administrative acts undertaken by foreign officials."' 128
Rather, the court expressly considered the policies underlying the
local action doctrine. 129 In this respect, the Packard court fashioned
a new approach to the jurisdiction issue in foreign patent claims
through its use of the abstention doctrine. This approach more ac-
curately reflects a foreign state's peculiarly local interest in its pat-
ents than an analysis grounded on whether a foreign administrative
official has acted.
doctrine permits a federal court to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.
Four distinguishable lines of cases and factual situations regarding abstention have been
recognized as appropriate:
(1) to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where the case
may be disposed of on questions of state law; (2) to avoid needless con-
flict with the administration by a state of its own affairs; (3) to leave to the
states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law; and (4) to ease
the congestion of the federal court docket.
C. WRiGHT, supra note 106, § 52, at 303.
123 This type of abstention, known as Burford-type abstention, takes its name from
the leading case of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). C. WRIGiHT, supra note
106, § 52, at 308.
124 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976).
125 346 F. Supp. at 410.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 411. Similarly, the Packard court expressed normal forum non conveniens
considerations. The court would have been dealing with seven foreign languages had it
accepted jurisdiction. It considered this a factor which weighed toward declining juris-
diction, given "It]he risks of distortion of meaning in translation .... Id.
128 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, at § 17.03.
129 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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C. Local Interest Considerations in Adjudicating Foreign
Copyright Infringement Actions
If considerations underlying the local action doctrine are rele-
vant to determining jurisdiction over foreign patents, the same con-
siderations should apply to foreign copyrights. Copyrights, like
patents, are created by the domestic law of each country. Each is a
property right individually tailored to promote that nation's
objectives.
[Copyrights] only exist because the laws of individual countries so
provide and they can only be enforced by action in the courts.
... The law is created because it is of benefit to the culture,
the economy or the political ideals of the country. Copyright law
is not a set of regulations of how people may deal with a form of
property that would exist independently of that law e.g., land,
goods, money, stocks and shares etc. If the law were repealed the
property would cease to exist. If the law is changed, the nature of
the property is changed.' 30
In promulgating copyright and patent laws, each country at-
tempts to balance the competing needs of society for access to
knowledge with the rights of the individual author or inventor to
control the dissemination of his work.131 However this balance is
struck, the property right created will reflect national policy objec-
tives tempered by specific contemporary national needs.' 32 Un-
doubtedly, a foreign state creating such property rights has an
interest in seeing that the powers associated with the right are prop-
erly construed and applied. 133
The foreign country is interested in having its patent and copy-
right laws properly applied in infringement actions quite apart from
whether an administrative formality is needed to perfect the particu-
lar property interest. Moreover, the nature of the property interest
130 Buck, Copyright, Harmonization and Revision: "International Conventions on Copyright
Law," 9 INT'L Bus. LAw. 475, 475-76 (1981).
[Similarly, i]n important respects books remain the yeast of economic,
social and cultural activity. They play a basic part in the communication
of ideas and in the growth and assimilation of knowledge, and are vital
not only to social and cultural life and to society, but also to the promis-
sion of economic growth and progress.
Dietz, Copyright Issues in the EEC: The recent decisions of the European Court ofJustice and of the
Commission, 30J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S. AM. 517, 528 (quoting Sept. 1980 memorandum
submitted by British Publisher Association to EEC).
'3' UNESCO, supra note 10, at 17.
132 Although various systems of national copyright protection exist, three main
branches of copyright law can be identified. They reflect the Roman legal tradition, the
Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, and socialist systems. Id. at 18.
133 Evans, Copyright and the Public Interest, UNESCO COPYRIGHT BuLL. 2 (Paris 1949).
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created by patents and copyrights makes proper application of those
laws difficult in any context. "Patents and copyrights approach,
nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discus-
sions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the
distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, and
sometimes, almost evanescent."' 13 4 Validity, infringement, fair use,
and other issues which a court must determine in a copyright action
often elude objective determination.
Copyright protection, for example, extends only to the author's
manner of expression; ideas, systems, principles, and methods may
not be copyrighted.' 3 5 To determine where the idea ends and ex-
pression begins is necessarily subjective. Judge Learned Hand said,
"Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.'
Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."' 136 Similarly, the cen-
tral question of infringement is whether there is substantial similar-
ity of expression between the accused work and copyrighted works.
Identical copying is not necessary to constitute infringement. 137
This determination rests with the ordinary observer and does not
involve "analytic dissection and expert testimony.'138 The issue is
whether the "total concept and feel" of the plaintiff's work has been
unlawfully appropriated.' 39
134 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Gas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 490).
135 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). "[T]he principle that copyright protects only the ex-
pression of an idea, but not the idea itself is generally accepted under foreign copyright
laws." 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.06[A] (footnotes omitted).
136 Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
137 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) defines infringement as the violation of "any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner," providing the courts with little or no assistance
in making that determination. The House Report stated that "[wlide departures or vari-
ations from the copyrighted work would still be an infringement as long as the author's
'expression' rather than merely the author's 'ideas' are taken." H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976). Most countries throughout the world similarly provide
a succinctly stated definition of infringement, which is expanded by judicial construc-
tions. See UNESCO & WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp.
1981).
138 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 851 (1947)).
139 Roth Greeting Card v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
"It seems clear that foreign jurisdictions apply essentially the same test of substantial
similarity as is followed by American courts. This is true in Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, and in Sweden." 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.13
(footnotes omitted).
Substantial copying will not be an infringement if the defense of fair use is success-
fully raised. "'Fair use' is 'a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the
monopoly granted to the owner'" by the copyright. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 1009 (1967) (quoting
BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). Under United States copyright
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Finally, given the subjective nature of the issues raised and the
reliance on translations of statutes, case law, and expert opinions,
potential harm to a foreign nation's interests exists. The policy un-
derlying the local action doctrine (assuring the sovereignty of the
state in which the property is located) applies equally to foreign
copyrights and foreign patents. The result of the litigation, whether
the allegedly infringing work will be prevented from dissemination
in a foreign country, is of local interest to that foreign country.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
American courts have the power to adjudicate foreign copyright
infringement actions. 140 Given the failure of the multilateral copy-
right conventions to provide a standard international answer,
whether jurisdiction is accepted depends on the particular national
court involved. This Note argues that the resolution of questions of
federal jurisdiction over such actions, proposed by Professor Nim-
mer and adopted by the London Film court, is flawed. Their resolu-
tion inadequately considers the concerns of the foreign state.
Forum non conveniens, however, is a more responsive and flex-
ible method for determining whether federal courts should accept
foreign copyright jurisdiction. The doctrine provides courts with
"the discretionary power. . . to decline to exercise a possessed ju-
risdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more
laws, the fair use doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The judicial doctrine of
fair use was codified for the first time in 1976 as part of the revision of the entire United
States Code Title on Copyright. Pub. L. No. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2546 (1976).
... Congress [did not] provide definitive rules when it codified the fair
use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list of factors "to be
considered": the "purpose and character of the use," the "nature of the
copyrighted work," the "amount and substantiality of the portion used,"
and perhaps the most important, the "effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work". . . . No particular weight,
however, was assigned to any of these, and the list was not intended to be
exclusive.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 806 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Virtually every country recognizes the fair use de-
fense for reasonable reproductions of works that are cultural, scientific, political, or edu-
cational. See UNESCO & WIPO, supra note 137.
"The [fair use] doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive right of a copy-
right holder with the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of
universal concern, such as art, science, history or industry." Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977). Thus, such balancing of the paramount public interest
continues throughout the infringement adjudication. See also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (fair use requires factual determination on
case-by-case basis and is justified by broad notions of public policy rather than strict
statutory definitions).
140 See Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 408.
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appropriately tried elsewhere."' 4' The doctrine involves two in-
dependent policy considerations: convenience to the litigants and
convenience to the forum. 142 The major drawback to forum non
conveniens is the need for an alternative forum as a prerequisite for
its application. The doctrine presupposes at least two forums where
the defendant can be served with process. 43 As illustrated in
London Film, 144 the combined effect of adopting Professor Nimmer's
theory145 and the requirement of a second forum for application of
forum non conveniens forces courts to try foreign copyright in-
fringement actions when no alternative forum exists. 146 This limita-
tion on the court's discretion results from denying the foreign state
141 Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L.
Ruv. 1, 1 (1929).
142 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In Gilbert the Supreme Court
suggested factors relevant to the forum non conveniens inquiry:
Important considerations [of the private interest] are the relative ease of
access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attend-
ance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, wit-
nesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the en-
forcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained ...
Factors of public interest also have place [sic] in applying the doc-
trine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled
up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty
is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a commu-
nity which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the af-
fairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view
and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn
of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized contro-
versies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that
must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum
untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Id. at 508-09.
143 Id. at 501, 506-07.
"At the outset of anyforum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether
there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily this requirement will be satisfied when the
defendant is 'amenable to process' in the otherjurisdiction." PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. 235,
254 n.22 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07). But see Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and
Choice of the Most Convenient Forum, 15 RUTGERs L. REv. 607, 611 (1961) (arguing that
there is no alternative forum requirement for forum non conveniens dismissal).
144 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
145 See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
146 Of course, if the defendant consents to appear in the more appropriate forum,
the court may conditionally dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. Mizokami
Bros. of Ariz. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 660 F.2d 712, 719 (8th Cir. 1981). See Note, Re-
quirement of a Sound Forum for Application of Forum Non Conveniens, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1199
(1959). That option is deficient in two respects. First, a defendant's refusal does not
mitigate the undesirable effects of assuming jurisdiction vis-a-vis the foreign state con-
cerned. Second, as in London Film, the foreign state may not be a more convenient forum
for either the plaintiff or the defendant. As Judge Carter stated, "neither plaintiff nor
defendant has demonstrated the relative advantage in convenience that another forum, com-
pared to this one, would provide." London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 50 (emphasis added).
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a separate sovereignty interest in the adjudication while focusing
solely upon convenience factors. 147 This approach will inevitably
compel federal courts to accept jurisdiction in foreign copyright
cases that may not be appropriate for United States courts to adjudi-
cate. In short, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, standing
alone, inadequately addresses the interests of foreign nations in this
type of adjudication.
In determining whether to accept foreign copyright jurisdic-
tion, courts should adopt an approach that incorporates both the
foreign country's local interests and the forum convenience of hear-
ing the case in the United States. Essentially, the Packard court 148
adopted a similar approach 149 in determining whether to adjudicate
foreign patent claims. The Packard court weighed the considera-
tions underlying the local action doctrine and declined jurisdiction
because the suit involved "a form of foreign governmental inter-
est."' 150 Although labelled as an application of the "abstention doc-
trine," the Packard court's action reflected its inability to make an
informed disposition of the action because of unfamiliarity with the
social and economic policies of the patenting nations and the need
to rely extensively upon translations, and thus its acknowledgement
of the danger to the foreign government's interest.' 5 '
This Note recommends that when American courts are consid-
ering whether to accept jurisdiction over foreign copyright claims,
they employ an interest analysis. In using such analysis, courts
should consider four factors: (1) the court's ability to make an in-
formed disposition of the foreign action, (2) the nature of the issues
presented, (3) the suitability of American enforcement of the judg-
ment, and (4) the convenience of the litigants and of the forum.
Such a discretionary approach provides needed flexibility. 152 As a
consequence, courts adopting this approach should determine the
weight to be accorded each factor on a case-by-case basis.
First, a court must candidly appraise its ability to correctly inter-
pret and apply the foreign law. The court must make its determina-
tion in light of the policies underlying national treatment: increased
competency of the courts and certainty of the law. 153 Thus, the
court must consider how dependent it will be on translations of ex-
pert opinions, statutes, case law, or the subject matter of the suit.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
148 346 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 114-28.
150 346 F. Supp. at 409 (quoting Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th
Cir. 1967) (Fairchild, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)).
151 See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
152 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249-50.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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The cultural, socio-economic, and political affinity existing between
the United States and the foreign country whose law governs the
action may indicate the American court's ability to understand the
policies upon which the foreign law is based. 54 In this respect, a
court may be more willing to adjudicate alien treaty rights granted
by a copyright convention of which the United States is also a
member., 55
154 See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
155 A court may be less willing to adjudicate treaty rights secured by a copyright
convention to which the United States is not a member. As between the United States
and the Berne Convention, there exists a fundamentally different premise on which the
legal basis and function of copyright rests. The difference in approaches is one of right
versus privilege.
The continental European concept, fostered by the Berne Union
which was established primarily at the behest of authors, regards an intel-
lectual work to some degree as an extension of the personality of the
author and gives broad protection to the author and his heirs automati-
cally upon his creation of the work for his life and a terms of years there-
after. There are no provisions for such formalities as copyright notice,
registration of ownership, deposit of copies, etc.
The other theory, prevailing under the United States Constitution,
and largely shared by the Latin-American nations, balances the author's
interests with the public interest, by insisting that copyright protection, at
least for published works, be subject to compliance with prescribed
formalities.
Henn, The Quest for International Copyright Protection, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 58 (1953) (foot-
notes omitted).
Possible areas in which American courts might lack sensitivity to the policies under-
lying Berne law and thus might not be competent to hear such a case include:
1. droit moral, Berne Art. 6 bis. The notion of droit moral or moral right has been
explained as the "right of the creator [of a work of art] to have the form of his work
preserved from deformation by subsequent transferees." Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral
Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554, 555 (1940).
Most countries that grant moral rights to authors include the right to withdraw a work
from sale and the right to prevent excessive criticism. Furthermore, moral rights often
are made inalienable. Droit moral is alien to the socio-economic underpinnings of United
States copyright law and generally is regarded as an unwarranted intrusion on the pur-
chaser's freedom of action. Buck, supra note 130, at 476-77.
2. retroactivity, Berne Art. 18. Remaining as one of the major stumbling blocks to
United States adherence to Berne, retroactivity provides that a new country acceding to
Berne must extend protection to works which have not fallen into the public domain in
their country of origin, even if the work previously was in the public domain of the new
country. ABA COMMITrEE REPORTS, SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT
LAw 149 (1982).
3. droit de suite, Berne Art. 14 (Paris). Droit desuite consists of allowing an artist who
sells his original work, which is subsequently resold at a profit, to share in that profit. It
is recognized in various countries including Belgium, Germany, France, and Italy. Buck,
supra note 130, at 477. In the United States, the first sale doctrine holds that a copyright
owner's rights of public distribution cease with respect to a particular copy once he has
parted with ownership. The exclusive right to vend the transferred copy rests with the
vendee. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. prohibition of formalities, Berne Art. 5(2). Technical formalities for securing
and perfecting a copyright interest are strictly prohibited. In the United States compli-
ance with statutory formalities necessary to perfect a copyright is an expression of the
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Second, courts should be sensitive to whether objective deter-
minations based on clearly defined standards can resolve the issue
or whether the court must make subjective determinations based on
policyjudgments. 156 For example, substantial similarity, the sina qua
non of infringement, is virtually incapable of measurement by clearly
defined standards. Rather, the point at which an accused work un-
lawfully expropriates the expression of another is a subjective deter-
mination which implicitly balances the author's proprietary interest
against the public interest in access to the accused work. 157 Con-
versely, infringements grounded merely in contractual disputes may
be less dependent upon such "evanescent" determination for their
resolution. In addition, a court must assess the possible implication
of policy questions whose importance transcends the result in the
case at bar.158 Thus, the nature of the work sought to be enjoined
(informational or entertainment, commercial or educational) may
bear upon the propriety of entertaining jurisdiction.
Third, the court must consider whether an American court has
the power to enforce the foreign claim, should the plaintiff pre-
vail. 159 Under national treatment, a court would apply the appropri-
ate remedies under the foreign country's laws, such as damages,
injunction, confiscation, and destruction. 160 If an American court
has proper jurisdiction and the parties remain within the United
States, the court can enforce its judgment by exercising its contempt
powers. 161 A foreign court, however, might refuse to accept a judg-
ment by an American court. 162 In such a case, the American court's
judgment is unenforceable, and hence, worthless.
Finally, the court must consider the normal forum non con-
veniens factors, such as the administrative and financial burdens of
preserving the foreign country's sovereignty interest. 63 Although
underlying philosophy that copyright is a statutory privilege, not an inherent right.
Henn, supra note 155, at 51.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
157 See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (Dr.
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech not placed in public domain when made
available to press without copyright notice). Query whether the same decision would
have been reached had the action been adjudicated in South Africa.
159 See supra text accompanying note 117.
160 UNESCO, supra note 10, at 59-60, 65.
161 Note, supra note 107, at 363.
162 See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
195 1),final order ent'd, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), and the British case decided in
conjunction with it, British Nylon Spinner v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1952] 1 Ch. 19
(English courts enjoined British corporation's compliance with district court's order to
reconvey certain British patents assigned to it under agreements which violated Sher-
man Act).
163 See supra note 142.
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the existence of an alternative forum may be relevant, it should not
be a prerequisite to an American court's decision to decline jurisdic-
tion. A foreign country's sovereignty interests in its copyrights are
"applicable regardless of whether all the requirements for dismissal
on the ground of forum non conveniens are present."' 64 Thus,
where such interests weigh heavily against a United States court's
adjudicating a particular case, the absence of an alternative forum
should not compel the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the for-
eign claim.
In sum, the interest approach for determining whether an
American court should exercise jurisdiction over foreign copyright
actions incorporates both the foreign country's local interests and
the forum convenience of hearing the case in the United States.
This approach builds upon the basic principle of national copyright
law, reaffirmed by international copyright conventions, namely, that
a copyright can be infringed and thus exists only within the sover-
eign state whose law created it. Consequently, the foreign state that
created the copyright maintains its interest in interpreting and ap-
plying its own copyright law. Such local interests do not necessarily
bar jurisdiction in another forum, but an American court must con-
sider them in deciding whether to accept or reject jurisdiction. The
interest approach thus attempts to provide for the foreign state's
interest.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that Professor Nimmer's act of
state/transitory action analysis for determining whether an Ameri-
can court should accept federal jurisdiction over foreign copyright
infringement actions, adopted by the London Film court, inade-
quately reflects the foreign state's interests in the adjudication. Sub-
sequent courts confronted with foreign copyright infringement
actions should not rely on a bright-line distinction based on whether
the foreign intellectual property right requires an administrative
formality to create or perfect that right (trademarks and patents) or
not (copyrights). Rather, this Note has proposed a more flexible
approach that gives due consideration to a foreign state's local in-
terest in enforcing its copyrights.
David R. Toraya
164 Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 410 (footnote omitted).
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